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BOOK REVIEWS

Kierkegaard after Macintyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue, edited by
John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, with replies by Alasdair Macintyre
and Philip L. Quinn. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2001. Pp. xxxix
+ 363. $56.95 (cloth), $26.95 (paper).
JOHN LIPPITT, University of Hertfordshire, UK.
This is an unusually interesting and thought-provoking collection of
essays. What starts off sounding like the narrowest of concerns - how in
part of one chapter of one of a contemporary philosopher's books, he gets
the details of one aspect of Kierkegaard's thought wrong - in fact turns out
to be a very rich seam for ethical enquiry. The editors' leading intuition
concerns the potential fruitfulness of a dialogue between Kierkegaard and
those figures in contemporary moral philosophy - Taylor, Williams,
Frankfurt, Nussbaum and Murdoch are mentioned - who have brought
back on to the ethical agenda debate about such issues as human flourishing, the moral psychology of the virtues and the conditions under which
human beings are able to find their lives meaningful and purposeful. I
share the editors' intuitions about this, and highly commend the way in
which they set the ball rolling with a dialogue between Kierkegaard and
one of the most important thinkers in moral philosophy over the past
twenty or thirty years, Alasdair Macintyre.
Several contributors argue that Macintyre's representation of
Kierkegaard in After Virtue is unfair. In chapter 4 of that text - the relevant
section of which is reproduced here - Macintyre presents Kierkegaard, at
least in Either/Or, as the irrationalist apostle of "criterionless choice" as the
only justification for the move from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere of
existence. In doing so, on Macintyre's story, Kierkegaard is a critical figure
in the breakdown of the attempt to give an independent rational justification of morality, and Either/Or is "a book which is at once the outcome and
the epitaph" (p. xxxv) of this attempt. Against this background, the essays
in Part One - all previously published - aim to show in various ways what
is wrong with this reading, in the process clarifying what the idea of
authentic 'self-choice' in Either/Or actually amounts to. Amongst the claims
made here are that Kierkegaard possesses, like Aristotle and neoAristotelianism, a teleological conception of freedom, and that "narrative
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unity" is an important part of his conception of ethical selfhood. This section includes essays by Peter Mehl on Kierkegaard's attempt to take
human subjectivity seriously without reducing it to mere ethical subjectivism, Jeffrey Turner on narrative and moral truth, Marilyn Piety on
Kierkegaard's conception of rationality, John Davenport on how
Kierkegaardian "choice" can be understood through a comparison with
Harry Frankfurt's conception of "volitional identification," and Gordon
Marino on the role of reason in Kierkegaard's ethics. Part Two takes further arguably the book's most interesting claim: that Kierkegaard's position is actually far closer to Macintyre's own than the latter realizes. The
main burden of many of the essays in Part Two, all but one first published
here, is to tease out aspects of these positive connections. Finally, Part
Three consists of interesting critical responses from Philip Quinn and
Macintyre himself.
The richness of the issues covered in this volume poses a problem for
the reviewer. I shall have to be unfair to several contributors by saying little or nothing about their essays. I'll concentrate on the newer material in
Parts Two and Three, but make an exception for one earlier essay, Jeffrey
Turner's. For Turner, one key aspect of the Kierkegaard-Macintyre debate
is that Kierkegaard is aware of a serious threat that "narrative theorists or
... commentators on Macintyre" (p. 43) have overlooked: the seductive
danger of the" aesthetic." The desire to "tell a good tale" about our lives
renders us prone to various kinds of self-deception as we try to convince
ourselves that are lives are more beautiful or interesting than they really
are. For Turner, such self-deception is manifested by Judge William, who
"has been carried away with his own story about himself" (p. 51). Though
his expressed aim is to save the aesthetic validity of marriage, Turner
argues that he preserves the aesthetic in everyday life only "by offering an
overly beautiful account of that life" (p. 51). For instance, he seems inadequately aware of the potential vulnerability of his own marriage, his attitude towards it being "one of complete confidence" (p. 50). He fails to scrutinize his assumption that his own marriage is "the ethical (and aesthetic)
norm" (p. 53). It is worth noting that when in Dependent Rational Animals
Macintyre criticizes his own earlier position (from After Virtue to Three
Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry), one of the things for which he takes himself
to task is precisely this downplaying of the ethical significance of human
vulnerability.
The basic threat of the aesthetic lies in its seductive power. If we are, in
Macintyre's famous phrase, "story telling animals," none of us want to tell
stories about ourselves that are dull or ugly. I would not want to endorse
Turner's strange claim that "a minimal condition of the moral truth of the
stories we tell about ourselves might well be that they can't be boring" (p.
54), since-to the extent that I understand what he means by "moral
truth" -I don't see what the truth of a story has got to do with its interestvalue. Indeed, in saying this, Turner risks spoiling one of his best insights.
His claim that we "cannot help but desire to tell and hear interesting and
beautiful tales" (p. 54) should surely be seen as a potentially truth-threatening problem, rather than something to which we need to accede.
Turner suggests that "moral truth is a certain relation between one's life
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itself and the stories one tells about one's life" (p. 55). This is fine as far as it
goes, but what does this claim ultimately amount to? Is it saying any more
than "avoid dishonesty, hypocrisy and self-deception"? It remains unclear
who can judge their life as being devoid of these vices, and from what
standpoint.
The first essay in Part Two is by Anthony Rudd. With admirable clarity,
Rudd rebuts Macintyre's "irrationalism" charge by showing Kierkegaard
as opposed not to rationality per se but only a "certain metaphysical
mythologisation of reason" (p. 136). Against Macintyre's "criterionless
choice" objection, Rudd suggests that Judge William is in fact offering an
argument, to the effect that the aesthetic life cannot provide a coherent
sense of personal identity; that personal fulfilment is therefore impossible;
and that it is thus rational for the aesthete to choose the ethical. According
to Rudd, Judge William's argument in favor of the ethical is basically the
same as Macintyre's argument in chapter 15 of After Virtue. Rudd notes
that A himself sometimes describes his life in terms of "despair," a button
that the Judge likes to press. A's life constitutes despair because it has "no
principle of unity": it lacks what Macintyre would call a "narrative structure." For Rudd, "Our lives make sense to us as long as we can tell ourselves an intelligible story about who we are and what we are doing. To
lack such a narrative structure in one's life is to lack any stable sense of personal identity" (pp. 138-9). And this is where A finds himself.
Rudd clearly shows one of the key connections between Macintyre and
Judge William, addressing central questions as to what gives meaning to a
human life. But I have a number of problems with his account, versions of
which also haunt other contributions. First, notions like "narrative structure" and "narrative unity," as used by both Macintyre and several contributors, are somewhat vague. In exactly what does the "narrative unity"
of a life consist? How strong a concept of "unity" is being supposed here,
and exactly what work is the term "narrative" doing? The concept of "narrative" at work in several of the essays needs to be further clarified.
"Narrative" is a very broad term, and nothing of much interest follows
about any given narrative from the mere fact that it is a narrative. To judge
any given narrative, we need to know what kind of narrative it is: the criteria we would use in judging a historical narrative, for example, are very
different from those we would use to judge a fictional one. So what are the
criteria by which a "life narrative" could be judged? Rudd focuses upon
the importance of intelligibility, but most aesthetes or sensualists could
surely tell a perfectly intelligible story about their identity and the principles according to which they live (for pleasure; to avoid boredom; for as
much anonymous sex as possible). A key problem is that often, the stories
we tell about ourselves are self-deceived, so a key difficulty is in knowing,
of any given "life narrative," whether it is honest. But the problem here is
not one of intelligibility.
Rudd sees the key argument as a hypothetical one: both Judge William
and Macintyre argue that if one wishes to live a meaningful life, then ethical commitments and the cultivation of the virtues will be necessary. And
he adds that according to Kierkegaard, we do all have a desire for coherence and meaning in our lives. But again, "coherence" and "meaning" are
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rather slippery terms: what rules out the possibility that the aesthete's life
has all the "meaning" that he needs? Condemnation of such a life can only
be made from a viewpoint already signed up to a substantive ethical position that he denies. So Macintyre's claim that there is no basis of agreement
from which aesthete and ethicist can start may be harder to defuse than
Rudd suggests. Also, both Rudd and the Judge stress A's tacit awareness
of his own "despair." But this appears to mean that the "hypothetical"
argument has no power over someone who lacks such awareness, or who
denies the truth of this description.
Rudd later points out how far Kierkegaard ultimately wants to go
beyond Judge William's position. Turner has already given us reason to
wonder whether the self-deception Rudd and the Judge see in A isn't also
found in the Judge himself. Similarly, Rudd goes on to consider several
problems that Kierkegaard sees with the Judge's conventional bourgeois
morality, which interestingly parallel problems that have been raised in
respect of Macintyre's own work. These, briefly, are the thoughts that the
ethical commitments the Judge and Macintyre commend may simply not
be available to us today (don't they depend upon a more stable community, with better defined roles than is seriously possible in contemporary
society?); the charge that neither of our duo gives us any real way of deciding between competing ethical commitments (to family, friends, work,
nation, and so on); and the charge that Macintyre's socially-based morality
allows insufficient room for the free flourishing of the individual (or, to the
extent that it does, whether it owes more to liberalism than Macintyre himself admits). Kierkegaard, Rudd suggests, ultimately held that "the need
for a strong sense of narrative unity cannot come simply from the occupancy of social roles" (p. 147). We need an overriding telos-purity of heart is
to will one thing-but only "the good" cuts the mustard. The real choice
becomes that between the aesthetic and the religious, as the ethical recedes
from the horizon. (This view is shared by at least one other contributor,
Bruce Kirmmse, who suggests that the ethical "ultimately appears to collapse" between the aesthetic and the religious, Kierkegaard's initial triad
becoming replaced by "Christianity vs. everything else" (p. 196).) But in
that case, what becomes of the claim that the ethical is superior to the aesthetic? I finished Rudd's article unclear as to whether he is ultimately
claiming that Judge William's position really is superior to A's, or whether
its apparent superiority is actually-for the above reasons-an illusion.
The remaining six articles in Part II can be grouped in two trios, concerned broadly with theology and moral psychology / virtue theory respectively. In response to the options After Virtue famously presents to us
("Nietzsche or Aristotle?"), Richard Johnson trades on Derrida and Levinas
to try to show that Kierkegaard can provide a better critique of Nietzsche
than does Macintyre. Like Karen Carr and Bruce Kirmmse, Johnson sees
Macintyre (due largely to his admiration for Aquinas) as underplaying the
split between Athens and Jerusalem. Carr considers how Kierkegaard's
treatment of Socrates is used to show how Christianity differs from
"paganism." She argues that Kierkegaard's view is not just a religious version of emotivism, since it holds to the authority of revelation as an
absolute standard, albeit one beyond human reason. Kirmmse, too, thinks
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Kierkegaard would view Christianity as a more radical departure from the
classical heritage than does Macintyre: notions of sin, grace and redemption are not just revisions to a broadly Aristotelian picture. Yet Kirmmse
also criticizes Kierkegaard for going too far, inheriting more than he realizes from the liberalism against which he sometimes rails. This is especially
so, for Kirmmse, in respect of his insistence in his late writings that the congregation has become "the ruination of Christianity" (Pap. XI 1 A 189, cited
on p. 204) and that Christianity is "abolished" once it and the world
"become friends." Kirmmse wonders what space there is in such an
"other-worldly" version of Christianity for "the Holy Spirit as the bearer of
God's community on earth" (p. 205).
One contentious aspect of Kirmmse's paper is his treatment of the way
in which how, along with the Christian notion of sin replacing the classical
notion of error, faith allegedly replaces virtue: that for Kierkegaard, "faith
is what Christianity puts forth instead of virtue" (p.197). But does this
mean that there could be no such thing as a Christian virtue ethics? This
does seem to be Kirmmse's view. Noting Macintyre's remark that humility
could find no place on the list of Greek virtues, and the fact that Aristotle's
catalogue of virtues contrast in some respects rather strikingly with those
of Christianity-consider for example meekness and purity of heartKirmmse wonders "whether it is useful to speak of Christian 'virtues' at
all," and asserts that "Kierkegaard, it is certain, would have looked with
disdain or bemusement upon this attempt to cobble together a compromise
table of virtues comprising both classical and Christian entries" (p. 198).
But this seems a rather uncharitable picture of what commentators interested in a dialogue between Kierkegaard and contemporary virtue ethics are
up to, as the remaining three essays of Part Two attest.
By considering Kierkegaard's treatment of Claudine in Fru
Gyllembourg's Two Ages, Norman Lillegard argues that for Kierkegaard
some varieties of aestheticism are compatible with the possession of virtues.
Can there, then, be aesthetic virtues, and if so how do they differ from ethical ones? Lillegard's answer also depends upon a certain kind of appeal to
narrative. He argues that Claudine is sub-ethical because she does not
choose her passions, and aims to make sense of how this can be done.
Lillegard recognizes that choice can play an important role in a life that
Kierkegaard would not characterize as ethical, so that even a certain kind of
aesthete can possess" a kind of coherence and narrative unity in her life" (p.
214). But what Claudine lacks is "the effort whereby she takes what she is
by nature and history ... [including her passions] ... and consciously tries to
integrate it into a rational self-concept by reference to which a more or less
unified life might be achieved" (p. 214). This, for Lillegard, is the essence of
choice in the Judge'S thought, and Lillegard connects it to Kierkegaard's
idea of a "life view," life views being "full of conscious teleology, thus full
of thought in the service of wholeness or unity" (p. 215).
Ultimately, Lillegard wants to support Anti-Climacus' view that "infinite passions require an infinite object ... capable of consuming all of one's
interest" (p. 219), a test no human being (or any finite passion) can pass.
But whatever one thinks of Anti-Climacus' argument here, note that this
seems to have put Lillegard in a similar position to Rudd. Insofar as any-
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thing short of an "infinite passion" for an "infinite object" fails the test, it is
now hard to see in what sense those virtues that Lillegard would count as
ethical are really any genuine kind of advance on merely aesthetic virtues.
The general idea seems to be that the former are capable of filling out life
more than the latter, though I was less than fully convinced as to how the
division into these categories is being made (Lillegard's distinction
between romantic and sporting passion underestimates the role of the latter in some people's lives, and of how it can be an arena for the exercise of
ethical virtues). However, the focus on "infinite passion" leaves mysterious, but intriguing, exactly how Lillegard would handle his later claimstrikingly opposed to Kirmmse's-that "the religious also must be understood in terms of passions and virtues" (p. 231).
Lillegard certainly raises some vitally important questions about the
kind of unity or "whole life" at play in claims about how a life needs to be
unified. I also think that he is on to something important in his focus on
what he calls "dimensional wholeness" (any adequate answer needs to
show how the various dimensions of my life-"personal, familial, vocational, civic, religious, and so forth" (p. 227)--can be unified) and "chronological wholeness" (how can these various passions be ordered over
time?). I am less convinced by Lillegard's talk of a quest for a life view that
can "somehow beat all competing life views" (p. 217).
In the context of Macintyre's discussion of the opposition between the
aesthetic and ethical worldviews, Edward Mooney's paper makes a valuable contribution to reminding us of the kind of moral dialogue that can
take place between exemplars of the Kierkegaardian existence-spheres.
Macintyre's treatment, he suggests, underestimates the significance of the
point that the Judge's writings are not just "an impersonal moral tract for
just any interested (or idle) reader" (p. 242), but concerned letters to a
friend. Even if A is unmoved by the Judge's case, it does not follow that no
moral communication has taken place. Nor does the lack of a resolution
show that we need immediately run to an "independent rational third
party," an "independently grounded rational principle" or a moral "superframework" (p. 244). A, the Judge and any likely reader will enter the
scene with certain assumptions in place. Yet there can be degrees of moral
disagreement, in which two people can share some assumptions and differ
on others. The fact that ultimately I do not" convert" you to my position in
an ethical debate does not necessarily mean that we have not learned
something significant from each other in the interchange. Mooney's essay
closes with an interesting discussion of the kind of will that Kierkegaard's
works are intended to encourage in the reader: a will marked by, amongst
other virtues, humility and yet autonomy of a certain kind.
Some of the concerns I have raised-all too briefly-about other papers
are tackled in more detail by the final essay of Part Two, by John
Davenport. Drawing on a qualified version of some of Frankfurt's work,
Davenport claims that" all mature human agents wholeheartedly will"
what he calls"existential coherence": a refashioning of our ground projects
until they mutually reinforce each other. Such "self-integration and unity
of life-narrative" (p. 293) is central to the telos of authenticity which lies at
the heart of the "existential virtue ethics" Davenport wants to draw on
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Kierkegaard to build. To achieve it, we must unify and integrate "some
reconcilable subset of worthwhile ends" (p. 293). But one problem here is
surely how we are to know which ends are harmonious. It may not be until
my life is nearly over that I can know that, though the ends of being a
philosopher and being a novelist were compatible for Sartre or Murdoch,
that in my own case, my pursuit of both has led me to fail in both.
Davenport, like Rudd and Lillegard, gives a central role to the "unity of
a narrative with a wide range of diverse themes and subplots" (p. 320).
But, as I have already suggested, more needs to be said than is said anywhere in the collection about wherein the unity of such a narrative consists. Moreover, it may be that thinking of one's life in narrative terms
makes one especially prone to supplying neat conclusions and interesting
connections between events, and the resultant problem of self-deception.
Furthermore, in his Part Three reply to Lillegard and Davenport, there is
Philip Quinn's objection that such a unification project may be less important than other contributors suppose: in addition, a focus upon it may
blind us to the importance of appreciating a diversity of values, which may
itself be a vital component of the "subjective meaningfulness" of a life.
Quinn's paper is a real bonus for the collection, since it challenges head-on
the assumption made by many of the other contributors, and the editors
acknowledge in their introduction the need to take on board Quinn's suggestion that the Apollonian focus on unity of purpose needs to be complemented by a more Dionysian vision of the self as a chorus of voices that do
not always sing in harmony.
Davenport acknowledges that "The hard problem is to interpret correctly
the difference between right and wrong kinds of diversity in a life of multiple
devotions, vocations and cares" (p. 320). This is indeed hard, but it seems to
me the absolute crux of the matter, on which the "narrative unity" story is
going to stand or fall. Unless the supporters of this view have an answer to
this question, I'm not sure exactly what they are telling us. Exactly what is
the difference, for instance, between Davenport's view and Quinn's suggestion that we should "welcome plural values into our lives, risking the possibility of tragic conflict among them, and to manage the inevitable tensions
as creatively and skilfully as we can" (p. 333)? Are the supporters of the narrative unity view recommending that we avoid such risk? If so, to what
degree; how are we to avoid the slippery slope towards monomania?
Finally, a generous-spirited reply from Macintyre himself makes
numerous concessions to his critics, but states a revised version of his
original charge. Although the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical
can be justified retrospectively, a recognition of the superiority of the ethical cannot act prospectively as the motive for an aesthete's life-changing
choice. This seems in harmony with some of the worries I have sketched
with excessive brevity above.
In conclusion, this fascinating collection clearly demonstrates both
Kierkegaard and Macintyre to be concerned with issues of fundamental
human concern. Macintyre expresses the hope that the conversation will
continue; the editors express their confidence that it will. I feel sure that
both the hope and the expectation are well-founded.

